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INTRODUCTION
Created in 1974, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
(“ECOA”) made it “unlawful for any creditor to discriminate
against any applicant, with respect to any aspect of a credit
transaction on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin,
sex or marital status, or age.” 1 Drawing from language present in
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, ECOA is a crucially important
bulwark against insidious behavior by creditors and lenders
against many of society’s most vulnerable populations. In service
of this goal, there have been a number of attempts by LGBT
advocates to expand ECOA to explicitly prohibit discrimination
against individuals on the basis of sexual orientation, relying
heavily on precedent established in Title VII cases. Efforts to do
so have found purchase in circuit court holdings, agency
adjudication, and statements by government officials. However,
there has been opposition to this expansion in other circuits and
by administrative agencies increasingly disinterested in
advocating for the expansion of regulation. With this in mind, I
argue that the best course of action for advocates is to push for
the explicit expansion of ECOA (and Title VII) by Congress, in
∗ J.D. Candidate, May 2020, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
1
15 U.S.C. § 1691.
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line with statutes existing in many states, as this approach avoids
the danger of a circuit split and is better insulated against the
actions of an executive and Supreme Court that are likely to be
hostile to such expansion.

I. EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT HISTORY AND
JURISPRUDENCE
Written so as to provide coverage to a number of
disfavored groups, ECOA was primarily intended to remedy (1)
perceived deficiencies in the credit reporting system that led to
the distribution of inaccurate and potentially harmful
information with little oversight on who could access it and (2)
discriminatory lending practices facing single women, a growing
problem in light of the increasing commonality of divorced and
unmarried women. 2 Despite the ubiquity of credit reports in
lending decisions, the content of these reports and the source of
the information therein was inaccessible to most consumers,
meaning that consumers could neither learn why they were
denied credit or whether the factors influencing that decision
were even accurately reported. 3
A lack of restrictions on who could access credit reports
meant that potential employers, landlords, and more could gain
access to potentially embarrassing or damaging information
without confidentiality mandates. 4 Compounding this problem
were the particular difficulties faced by women applying for
credit. Single women were often seen as risky borrowers, such
that even with otherwise good credit reports, gender could prove
a dispositive factor in the lender’s eyes. 5 This problem was
especially prevalent among divorced or widowed women, who
were forced to reapply for credit that was previously granted to
them in light of their newly unmarried status. 6 In light of these
discriminatory practices against women, Congress passed ECOA,
a broad statutory reform that mandated numerous disclosures by
creditors and prohibited discrimination against often disfavored
groups, and set out its terms in its implementing regulation,
Regulation B. 7 Notably, the statutory language contained within
2
Elwin Griffith, The Quest for Fair Credit Reporting and Equal Credit
Opportunity in Consumer Transactions, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 37, 38 (1994).
3
Id.
4
Id. at 39.
5
Id. at 41.
6
Id.
7
Id.
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ECOA was heavily influenced by the language within Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act, a similarly worded statute that prohibited
discrimination in the employment context on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. 8 The connection between
ECOA and Title VII is crucially important in predicting courts’
interpretations of ECOA’s language.
Much of ECOA’s jurisprudence stems from its connection
to Title VII. Indicators of legislative intent during the creation of
ECOA indicated that, in Congress’s eyes, courts should be guided
by precedent established under Title VII to determine how
provisions of ECOA should be understood. 9 The court followed
suit, holding in cases like Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co. that
when interpreting ECOA, the court would consider Title VII case
law and follow the greater depth and breadth of precedent in the
Title VII area due to the nearly identical language in the two
statutes. 10 With this in mind, and considering the lack of court
holdings on the issue of sexual orientation discrimination in the
ECOA context, holdings based in Title VII are an important
bellwether for the future of ECOA holdings in this area.

II. PROHIBITION OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION
DISCRIMINATION IN TITLE VII AND ECOA
The ancestor of modern holdings finding a prohibition on
sexual orientation discrimination in Title VII is Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins, where the Supreme Court held that discrimination on
the basis of gender nonconformity was actionable sex
discrimination under Title VII. 11 In that case, a female
partnership candidate at an accounting firm brought a claim
under Title VII, alleging that she had been passed over for
promotion, despite high praise from her superiors and exemplary
qualifications, for being too “macho” and exhibiting
characteristics that would have been otherwise ignored in a male

8
9

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

See S. Rep. No. 94-589, 94th Cong., 2d. Sess., 4-5 (1976) (stating that

Congress intended for judicial holdings in Title VII to influence holdings
interpreting the language of ECOA).
10
Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 215 (1st Cir. 2000);
see Mercado-Garcia v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 979 F.2d 890, 893 (1st Cir. 1992)
(applying the burden-shifting test used in Title VII cases to ECOA); see also
Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs. Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 406 (6th Cir. 1998) (applying the
same test).
11
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989).
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partnership candidate. 12 Writing for the plurality, Justice
Brennan held that the plaintiff being passed over for a promotion
came as a result of her displaying traits typically associated with
male candidates constituted prohibited discrimination on the
basis of sex. 13 The legacy of this case is significant, particularly in
relation to sexual orientation discrimination. Whereas traditional
sex discrimination cases involve a plaintiff who was treated
adversely on the basis of perceived traits typical to their gender,
Price Waterhouse stands for the opposite: a plaintiff
discriminated against for displaying traits atypical to her
gender. 14 This second formulation has proven to be important
precedent in protecting gay and lesbian persons whose sexual
orientation is seen as atypical to their gender. Thus, this
precedent could be used in the sexual orientation discrimination
cases going forward. 15
A prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation has been found within Title VII in two circuits, the
Second and Seventh. 16 In both cases, the appellate courts read
sexual orientation protections into the prohibition on sex
discrimination, another protection guaranteed by Title VII and
ECOA. First, the Seventh Circuit held in Hively v. Ivy Tech
Community College of Indiana that discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation is prohibited sex discrimination. 17 The court
arrived at this holding from two different legal theories: the
comparative method, centering the issue on whether the plaintiff
would have been treated differently had she been a man; and the
associational discrimination theory, that sexual orientation
12
13
14

Id. at 234-35.
Id. at 250, 258.
See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998)

(holding that if the prospective employee is the same sex as the decision
making employer, sex discrimination can still occur); see also Griggs v. Duke
Power Co. 401 U.S. 424, 436 (holding that making a decision based on
characteristics typically associated with individuals of a protected class also
constitutes prohibited discrimination).
15
An analogous case in the ECOA context is Rosa v. Park West Bank &
Trust Co., discussed above, where the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
held that refusal to grant a loan to a prospective male customer who wore
traditionally feminine clothing constituted prohibited sex discrimination under
ECOA. That court, citing Price Waterhouse, held that if the prospective
customer was denied service because he wore traditionally feminine attire, that
would constitute impermissible sex discrimination akin to the discrimination in
Price Waterhouse. Rosa, 214 F.3d at 216.
16
Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339 (7th
Cir. 2017); Zarda v. Altitude Express, 883 F.3d 100 (2nd Cir. 2018).
17
Hively, 853 F.3d at 351-52.
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discrimination is sex discrimination based on the sex of the
plaintiff’s associates. Employing the comparative method, the
court found that sexual orientation discrimination was on its face
identical to other forms of sex discrimination. 18 This method asks
if, holding all other things constant, had the plaintiff’s sex been
different (here, had the plaintiff been a man rather than a
woman), would the employer’s decision be different? 19 The court
held that it clearly would have; had the plaintiff been a man, her
sexual preference for women would not have been a disqualifying
factor in the instant case. 20 From this perspective, sexual
orientation discrimination is no different than other forms of sex
discrimination; a prospective female employee treated adversely
for being a lesbian is being discriminated against based on her sex
in the same way that she would be if the employer’s basis was
instead a belief that women were less capable or competent. If
this employee were a man in either case, the employer would not
disqualify her.
When analyzing the associational discrimination theory,
the court held that sexual orientation discrimination was also sex
discrimination by association, that is, the individual was being
discriminated against because of the sex of her associates, itself a
prohibited basis under Title VII. 21 The court relies heavily on the
landmark case Loving v. Virginia, where the Supreme Court held
that discrimination against an individual based on the race of
their spouse was prohibited as if the individual in question was
his or her self the target of that discrimination. 22 Similar to the
comparative method above, the basis for that decision is that if
the plaintiff was the same race (or sex) as their associate, the
employer’s decision would have been different. 23 The court drew
clear parallels between adverse treatment on the basis of the race
of one’s sexual partners and adverse treatment on the basis of the
sex of one’s sexual partners in ultimately holding that sexual
orientation discrimination was sex discrimination based on this
theory as well. 24
The Second Circuit held simialrly in Zarda v. Altitude
Express, Inc. where it held that sexual orientation discrimination
is motivated in part by sex and is thus prohibited sex
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Id. at 345-46.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 347.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 347-48.
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discrimination. 25 Referencing Hively, the Zarda court performed
a similar analysis of both the comparative method and
associational theory that led the Hively court to its holding. 26 Of
particular importance to the Zarda court was the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission’s (“EEOC”) holding in
Baldwin v. Foxx (discussed below), which held that sexual
orientation and sex were so intimately linked that any decision
made on the basis of sexual orientation should be understood as a
decision made on the basis of sex. 27 For these reasons, the court
here held in line with the court in Hively, that sexual orientation
discrimination is prohibited sex discrimination.
Aside from these holdings in circuit courts, the EEOC has
issued its own rulings that find sexual orientation discrimination
to be prohibited under Title VII. 28 In Baldwin v. Foxx, the
EEOC held that “sexual orientation as a concept cannot be
defined or understood without reference to sex.” 29 An individual’s
sexual orientation cannot be understood without understanding
sex. Even the simplistic gay-straight binary is defined entirely by
the individual in question’s sex; put simply, a gay man being
discriminated against is fundamentally being discriminated
against on the basis of his sex, as a woman with the same sexual
interests would not be discriminated against on the basis of her
sexual orientation. Due to this inextricable link, the agency held
that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is purely sex
discrimination, as it relies on treating an employee differently
than a similarly situated employee who is of a different sex, and
thus prohibited under Title VII. 30 As discussed above, Title VII is
an important analogous case to ECOA; a strong statement from
the agency in that area on this topic is evidence that the enforcing
agency in the lending context should follow suit.
Former leadership of the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (“CFPB”), the enforcing agency for ECOA, also
supported application of the holdings in Hively and Zarda and
the EEOC’s ruling in Baldwin to ECOA. In a letter to an
advocacy group for LGBT older adults, former CFPB Director
25
26
27

Zarda, 883 F.3d at 112.
Id. at 113-15.
Id. at 113.

The EEOC is the federal administration that enforces civil rights and
discrimination laws in the workplace and is the primary entity that deals with
Title VII cases.
29
Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, 5
(July 15, 2015).
30
Id.
28
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Richard Cordray presented the agency’s perspective that sexual
orientation discrimination was prohibited discrimination based
on an individual’s association. 31 Citing official Regulation B
interpretations, Cordray noted that discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation is essentially discrimination based on the sex of
those the individual associates with, a form of sex discrimination
recognized in those interpretations. 32 Rather than limiting
ECOA’s prohibitions to just the individual in question, these
official interpretations noted that lenders were also prohibited
from discriminating against an individual because of traits of
those associated with the individual, such as co-applicants,
spouses, or business partners. 33 These interpretations line up with
the Circuit Court holdings in Hively and Zarda and are clearly a
boon for proponents of the prohibition of sexual orientation
discrimination. If an individual is judged for the sex of their
sexual partners, the “discrimination by association” that Cordray
describes indicates that sex discrimination has occurred. Under
this theory, Cordray argued that in the ECOA context, sexual
orientation discrimination is prohibited sex discrimination.
As shown above, there is substantial support for a reading
of sexual orientation discrimination into the prohibition on sex
discrimination in ECOA and Title VII. The issue, however, is by
no means settled law, and there is a great deal of opposition to
this expansion from other sources.

III. OPPOSITION TO JUDICIAL EXPANSION OF ECOA
AND TITLE VII PROTECTIONS
Despite hard-fought victories against sexual orientation
discrimination in both the Second and Seventh Circuits, there
remains substantial opposition to these holdings in the courts and
elsewhere. In Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital, the Eleventh
Circuit set forth the clearest recent holding opposing the
expansion of sex discrimination to include sexual orientation
discrimination. There, the court held that discrimination against
an employee who is gay is not violative of the prohibition on sex
discrimination and that sexual orientation discrimination is not
Letter from Richard Cordray, CFPB Director, to Michael Adams,
CEO, Services & Advocacy for GLBT Elders, 4 (Aug. 30, 2016) (PDF from the
CFPB
Journal).
https://www.cfpbmonitor.com/wpcontent/uploads/sites/5/2016/09/SAGE-Letter.pdf
32
Id.
33
See Official Staff Commentary, 12 C.F.R. pt. 1002, Supp. 1 ¶2(z)-1,2.
31
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prohibited under Title VII. 34 In that court’s eyes, the fact that
many gay and lesbian individuals would be protected under Price
Waterhouse (from discrimination due to their “stereotypically gay
conduct”), meant that the prohibited discrimination is not on the
basis of their sexual orientation but on their conduct. 35
Other courts have held similarly to the court in Evans in
cases decided around the beginning of the millennium. In Higgins
v. New Balance, the First Circuit held that harassment on the
basis of an employee’s sexual orientation is not prohibited by
Title VII, as did the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth,
and Tenth Circuits in similar cases decided up until the early
2000s. 36 These cases held that discrimination based on a person’s,
often speculative, sexual orientation stemming from the way they
dress, speak or act, is unprotected. Instead, harassment or
negative treatment due to the exhibition of characteristics
atypical for one’s gender is all that is protected. 37 Understanding
the distinction between these two facially similar ideas is crucially
important. While, as the court in Higgins notes, individuals who
are discriminated against for sexual orientation will often be
judged as such because they present themselves atypically for
their gender, this by no means covers the entire spectrum of gay
and lesbian persons. 38 Individuals who exhibit characteristics the
Evans court called “stereotypically gay” may be protected if they
can prove they are being judged for those characteristics rather
than their orientation. However, this is a difficult task, as often
the basis for negative treatment of individuals with atypical
characteristics is a belief that those characteristics are evidence
that the individual is gay or lesbian. Further, individuals who
exhibit characteristics typical for their gender are wholly
unprotected from discrimination on the basis of their sexual
orientation and thus completely unprotected in that court’s eyes.
Another potential source of opposition to a broader
reading of ECOA that prohibits sexual orientation discrimination
34

2017).
35

Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital, 850 F.3d 1248, 1256 (11th Cir.

Id. at 1260.

Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 260-61 (1st
Cir. 1999); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 260-61 (3d.
Cir. 2001); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am, 99 F.3d 138, 142-43 (4th Cir. 1996);
Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 452 F.3d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 2006); Williamson v.
A.G. Edward & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 69-70 (8th Cir. 1989); Rene v. MGM
Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1063-64 (9th Cir. 2002); Medina v. Income
Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2005).
37
Higgins, 194 F.3d at 261.
38
Id.
36
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is the current CFPB. Writing for The Wall Street Journal in 2018,
then-CFPB Director and current Director of the Office of
Management and Budget Mick Mulvaney argued that the CFPB
had become too active in its enforcement of ECOA, and had
mistakenly treated the financial-service industry as the “bad
guys.” 39 In service of this goal, Mulvaney attempted to eliminate
the CFPB’s fair-lending office of its enforcement powers,
effectively weakening penalties for firms engaging in
discriminatory practices. 40 Though Mulvaney no longer heads the
Bureau, his statements on this subject are still indicative of the
agency’s direction under the Trump administration; a diminished
focus on enforcement of ECOA, and a disinterest in any efforts to
expand ECOA through advocacy in the courts. While Mulvaney
did not speak on the issue of sexual orientation discrimination
during his tenure as director, his emphasis on the CFPB as a
passive agency rather than an active force engaging in advocacy
is telling. As discussed above, under the Obama administration,
CFPB leadership saw the agency as an active advocative force,
one that was particularly concerned with following the lead of
Title VII cases and expanding the definition of sex discrimination
to include sexual orientation discrimination. A lack of movement
in that direction indicates that the CFPB under the new
administration is unlikely to undertake the necessary advocacy to
extend holdings in Title VII to ECOA.
Another foe to this expansion within the federal
government is the Department of Justice. As discussed above, the
Second Circuit held in Zarda that sexual orientation
discrimination is prohibited sex discrimination. 41 The court did so
against the urging of the Department of Justice in an amicus brief
filed in that case. 42 In that brief, the Department of Justice
(“DOJ”) advanced several theories as to why sexual orientation
discrimination did not fall within sex discrimination. According
to the DOJ, the bar against sex discrimination in Title VII is not
39
Mick Mulvaney,The CFPB Has Pushed Its Last Envelope, THE WALL
ST. JOURNAL (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-cfpb-haspushed-its-last-envelope-1516743561 (accessed Feb. 15, 2019).
40
Berry, Kate, CFPB’S Mulvaney strips his fair-lending office of
AMERICAN
BANKER
(Feb.
01,
2018),
enforcement
powers,
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/cfpbs-mulvaney-strips-his-fairlending-office-of-enforcement-powers (accessed Feb. 23, 2019). Mulvaney later
reneged on this stance, stating at a CFPB symposium on fair lending that the
Bureau was still focused on ensuring that lenders did business fairly.
41
Zarda, 883 F.3d at 113.
42
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 1, Zarda v. Altitude
Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (July 26, 2017).
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implicated unless men and women are treated unequally. 43 In its
opinion, the key question was whether homosexual men and
women were being treated differently, not whether gay men were
being treated differently from straight women, or vice versa. 44
The court in Zarda responded directly to this argument, stating
that the defense, and by extension the DOJ, misapplied the
statute. 45 The DOJ’s argument, according to the Zarda and
Hively courts, did not keep all factors other than sex constant; in
fact, it intentionally did otherwise. 46 The DOJ changed the sexual
attraction of the individual in question so as to obfuscate the core
issue of sex discrimination at the heart of sexual orientation
discrimination. 47 Another of the DOJ’s key arguments, the one
that fared better, was that Congress had been given ample
opportunity to amend Title VII to include a prohibition on sexual
orientation discrimination, and had deliberately chosen not to. 48
The brief cites Congress’s explicit reference to sexual orientation
discrimination in other statutes that also barred sex
discrimination, such as the Violence Against Women Act and
housing statutes. 49 The conspicuous lack of sexual orientation
discrimination, in light of its presence in other statutes alongside
sex discrimination, was strong evidence of Congressional intent in
the eyes of the DOJ. 50 Congress was certainly aware of the
practice of sexual orientation discrimination, according to the
DOJ, so its choice not to include it in the statute more clearly
indicates that it had no intention of prohibiting such
discrimination. 51
A reading of sexual orientation discrimination into the
prohibition on sex discrimination has been largely unsupported
by many circuits, and recent statements from relevant
governmental agencies suggests that there is little the executive
branch will do to further such arguments. With that in mind, it is
important now to turn to possible avenues to continue the
positive momentum from cases like Hively and Zarda.

43
44
45
46
47

Id. at 4.
Id.
Zarda, 883 F.3d at 113-14.
Id. at 114.

Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6,7, Zarda v. Altitude

Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (July 26, 2017).
48
Id. at 10.
49
Id. at 13.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 14.
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IV. ADVOCATING FOR THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION
Taking into account the above, it is unclear what the best
course of action for advocates of a prohibition on sexual
orientation discrimination is. While some circuits have found
sexual orientation discrimination to be a type of sex
discrimination in the employment context, others draw a bright
line between the two and hold that sexual orientation
discrimination is permissible. Though previous CFPB leadership
and the EEOC have agreed with holdings that prohibit sexual
orientation discrimination, the current CFPB has been publicly
opposed to taking significant action in any area, and there is
strong evidence based on the DOJ”s action that even if it was
more active, it would not be in pursuit of this goal. Finally,
despite interpretations of ECOA that suggest it has always
prohibited sexual orientation discrimination as sex discrimination
by association, Congress has resisted adding language that
explicitly clarifies the relationship between the two concepts.
The obvious avenue for further advocacy is through the
Circuit Courts. While, as discussed above, many circuits have
holdings explicitly rejecting the inclusion of sexual orientation
discrimination in sex discrimination, there are several factors that
indicate potential opposite holdings. First, outside of the
Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Evans, these cases range from
fifteen to thirty years old, long before the EEOC’s explicit
support for the inclusion of sexual orientation discrimination
within sex discrimination in its adjudication in Baldwin or the
friendly holdings in Hively and Zarda. Importantly, those cases
do little to reject the two dominant theories advanced by the
EEOC and the Hively and Zarda courts that have come to
characterize advocacy in this area: the comparative and
associational methods discussed above. Second, these cases are
all explicitly within Title VII jurisprudence. While it is certainly
inaccurate to state that these holdings are limited to Title VII,
advocates of a prohibition of sexual orientation discrimination
should be emboldened by the fact that there has been no adverse
holdings in an ECOA case, such holdings (and, of course, their
positive counterparts), have been exclusively on the topic of Title
VII. Thus, there is not the precedential mountain to overcome for
courts seeking to provide these protections to individuals on the
basis of sexual orientation.
In spite of these potential benefits, there are serious
reasons to doubt the efficacy of a strategy hoping to establish
these protections through the judicial branch. Perhaps most
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pressing of these is simple accounting: of the twelve regional
circuit courts, only two have held that sexual orientation
discrimination is within sex discrimination, and while many of
the adverse holdings are over two decades old, they still have
binding precedential value. Attempting to overturn binding
precedent in ten circuits is a monumental task, and a focus
entirely on overcoming the existent circuit split increase the
possibility of a second detrimental outcome: an adverse Supreme
Court holding seeking to settle the dispute across circuits.
Though there is little indication of how the Supreme Court will
hold on this specific issue, there are several factors that suggest
that if the Supreme Court were to get involved, it would likely do
so in a way that is adverse to the interests of LGBT advocates.
First, there are significant textualist arguments, likely to
find support among the court’s more conservative members, that
the strict language of ECOA does not include sexual orientation
discrimination. These textualists would also argue that
Congress’s failure to include this discrimination in the language
of the statute at a later date indicates that “sex”, in the context of
ECOA, does not include sexual orientation. This argument seems
particularly substantial in light of its status as the primary
argument advanced by the DOJ in its amicus brief in Zarda. 52
Even if this textualist argument was not sufficient on its own,
precedent indicates that at minimum three of the justices,
Roberts, Thomas, and Alito, are unlikely to be sympathetic to this
outcome on the basis of the same political beliefs that motivated
their dissent in Obergefell v. Hodges. 53 Finally, the precedent
opposing the expansion of sex discrimination to include sexual
orientation discrimination outnumbers holdings in favor of it tento-two. While this is by no means a dispositive factor, it further
indicates to the Supreme Court what the dominant position
Id. at 13.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015). In his dissent (joined by
Thomas), Roberts argues that to change the definition of marriage to include
same-sex marriage would constitute the court acting as a legislature and going
against Congressional intent. Id. at 2611. Such an argument seems likely to be
applied to the ECOA context as one of the textualist arguments discussed
above. In his dissent, Thomas contends that to expand marriage to include
same-sex couples would harm the innateness of “human dignity” and works to
demean those same-sex couples. Id. at 2631, 2639. Finally, Alito contends that
to permit same-sex marriage runs the risk of marginalizing those with
“traditional ideas.” Id. at 2643. The perspectives advanced by the dissents in
Obergefell indicate a contingent of the Supreme Court that is likely to be
hostile to judicial expansion of ECOA, especially judicial expansion with this
result.
52
53
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supported by many of the lower courts is. Even without Supreme
Court intervention, this strategy runs the risk of unequal
protections across the country, a problem that already exists with
positive holdings by the Second and Seventh Circuits and adverse
holdings nearly everywhere else.
Next, appeals to the executive agency that controls in this
area, the CFPB, are likely fruitless. The CFPB has demonstrated
little to no interest in expanding its role as a force for advocacy in
the courts or in adjudication friendly to proponents of the
prohibition. It seems unlikely, with the statements of former
director Mulvaney in mind, that the CFPB would pursue the
strong stance that former director Cordray advocated for based
on the actions of the EEOC in the Title VII area. Added to this is
a pervasive disinterest in increasing regulation from
administrative agencies under direction of the Trump
administration, and it seems unlikely that the CFPB would take a
major role in pursuing this policy goal. 54
Considering the positives and negatives of pursuing either
a judicial or executive solution, the best route available to
advocates of a prohibition on sexual orientation discrimination in
ECOA is legislative. Despite Congressional inaction in the area,
there are strong reasons for pursuing this route. Perhaps the most
straightforward of these is that Congress is the government body
currently most likely to be receptive to the interests of LGBT
advocacy groups, especially in the Democrat-controlled house.
Further, a legislative strategy avoids many of the problems
discussed above. Overcoming the arguably shaky jurisprudential
ground on which positive holdings stand in relation to arguments
like those advanced by the DOJ that Congress’s intent is clear in
the statute as written are the obvious first benefit. Members of
Congress sympathetic to the cause of prohibiting sexual
orientation discrimination would do well to push for such an
inclusion, as it seems likely that the current executive will
continue to advance arguments that had Congress intended to
include sexual orientation discrimination in the statute, it would
have. Additionally, a legislative strategy removes the need for socalled “activist judges” who feel comfortable reading meaning not
explicitly within ECOA into the statute, a criticism levied against
the court in Zarda by the DOJ. 55 Finally, and most importantly,
54
See Exec. Order No. 13771, 82 Fed.Reg. §9339 (2017) (the 2-for-1 rule,
stating that for every new regulation, two must be eliminated).
55
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 14, Zarda v. Altitude
Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (July 26, 2017).
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as in any civil rights context, Congressional action on both ECOA
(and Title VII) achieves the most important goal: clearly defining
and reaffirming the essential rights held by citizens of the US.
Unevenly enforced laws under a circuit split that allows creditors
in some states but not others to discriminate against applicants on
the basis of sexual orientation leaves individuals, largely unaware
of what protections ECOA provides, without the ability to
accurately judge why they are being declined credit. Such an
action would further accomplish the core goal of ECOA, to
provide consumers with the assurance that creditors are basing
their decisions solely on relevant, appropriate characteristics.

